State v. Marr Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 39918 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-3-2013
State v. Marr Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39918
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Marr Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39918" (2013). Not Reported. 887.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/887
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAH 
) STATE OF IDAHO, 
OPY 
) No. 39918 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Kootenai Co. Case No. 
vs. ) CR-2011-17515 
) 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 




JOHN C. MITCHELL 
Clark & Feeney, LLP 
PO Box 285 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ................................. 1 
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 2 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 3 
I. Marr Has Failed To Establish The District Court 
Abused Its Sentencing Discretion .............................................. 3 
A. Introduction ...................................................................... 3 
B. Standard Of Review ........................................................ 3 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its 
Sentencing Discretion ...................................................... 3 
II. If This Court Considers Marr's Ineffective Assistance 
Of Counsel Claims, The Claims Fail Because Marr Has 
Failed To Cite Anything In The Record To Support His 
Claims Or Otherwise Establish Counsel Was Ineffective ........... 7 
A. Introduction ...................................................................... 7 
B. Standard Of Review ........................................................ 7 
C. Appellate Courts Generally Do Not Consider 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims Raised 
On Direct Appeal; However, To The Extent 
This Court Considers Marr's Claims, Nothing 
In The Record Supports His Assertion That Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective .................................................. 7 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 12 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ......................................................................... 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612,262 P.3d 255 (2011) ................................................. 7 
Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 702 P.2d 826 (1985) ................................................ 9 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011) ............................................................. 10 
Idaho State Bar v. Clark, 153 Idaho 349, 283 P .3d 96 (2012) ................................... 9 
Parrottv. State, 117 Idaho 272,787 P.2d 258 (1990) ................................................ 8 
Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 203 P.3d 1221 (2009) ........................................... 8, 9 
State of Idaho v. John Marr, Kootenai County Case No. CR-2011-17515 ................. 8 
State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 44 P.3d 1122 (2002) .............................................. 4 
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989) ..................................... 10 
State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568, 249 P.3d 367 (2011) .......................................... 3, 4 
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009) .................................. 3 
State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 57 P.3d 782 (2002) ............................................... 3 
State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 859 P.2d 972 (Ct. App. 1993) ................................ 9 
State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 304 P.2d 1101 (1956) ................................................ 4 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003) .............................................. 4 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 P.3d 472 (2002) .................................................. 4 
State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 804 P.2d 1369 (Ct. App. 1991) ............................. .4 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ....................................................... 10 
United States v. Olson, 846 F.2d 1103 (ih Cir. 1988) ............................................. 11 
ii 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 19-2521 ........................................................................................................ 3, 4 
RULES 
I.A.R. 35 ..................................................................................................................... 9 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
John Marr appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery. Marr contends the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion and that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Marr with attempted strangulation and felony domestic 
battery after he assaulted his wife, Marcy. (R., pp.20-21, 38-39.) Marr pied not 
guilty and the case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.42, 64-76.) A jury acquitted Marr of 
attempted strangulation but found him guilty of felony domestic battery. (R., p.121.) 
The court imposed a unified ten-year sentence with eight years fixed. (R., pp.137-
139, 151-152.) Marr filed a timely notice of appeal. 1 (R., pp.140-142.) 
1 Pursuant to Marr's motion, this appeal was subsequently suspended pending the 
district court's decision on restitution and Marr's Rule 35 motion. (Motion to 
Suspend Appeal, dated October 26, 2012; Order Granting Motion to Suspend 
Appeal, dated November 26, 2012.) The appeal was reinstated after the Court 
"determined that the Rule 35 Motion Hearing was WITHDRAWN and the hearing 
previously scheduled for December 11, 2012, was VACATED." (Order to Reinstate 
Appeal Proceedings, dated January 7, 2013 (emphasis original).) 
1 
ISSUES 
Marr states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in imposing an excessive 
sentence? 
2. Was the Defendant ineffectively assisted by counsel? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.1.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Marr failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing a unified 10-year sentence with eight years fixed for felony domestic 
battery in light of the nature of the offense, his criminal history, and his lack of 
rehabilitative potential? 
2. Should this Court consider Marr's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims on direct appeal? If this Court considers Marr's claims, has he failed to cite 





Marr Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Marr contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentencing, 
claiming the court "failed to consider the sentencing factors in I.C. § 19-2521" and 
"failed to consider any of the well established sentencing goals in sentencing [him] to 
a fixed term of 80% of the maximum with the other 20% of the maximum being 
indeterminate." (Appellant's Brief, pp.1-2.) A review of the record and the relevant 
legal standards shows Marr has failed to establish the district court abused its 
sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A district court's sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27,218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
"When a sentence is challenged as being excessively harsh, [this Court] 
independently review the record on appeal, having due regard for the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest." 
State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568, 575, 249 P.3d 367, 374 (2011) (quoting State v. 
Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 76, 57 P.3d 782, 787 (2002)). In doing so, the Court 
considers the defendant's entire sentence, but presumes "the fixed portion of the 
sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement." Flowers, 150 Idaho 
at 575, 249 P.3d at 374 (citation and quotations omitted). "When determining 
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whether the sentence is excessive, [the Court] must consider: (1) the protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the defendant and others; (3) the possibility of the 
defendant's rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for the defendant." ll;L_ 
(quoting State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460-61, 50 P.3d 472, 475-76 (2002)). "A 
sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be sufficient." State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,285, 77 P.3d 956,974 (2003) (citing State v. Waddell, 119 
Idaho 238, 241, 804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App. 1991 )). "The primary consideration 
is, and presumptively always will be, the good order and protection of society. All 
other factors are, and must be, subservient to that end." State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 
359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956). "In order to show that the sentence imposed 
was unreasonable, the defendant must show that the sentence, in light of the 
governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts." Flowers, 
150 Idaho at 575, 249 P.3d at 374 (quoting State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 73, 44 
P.3d 1122, 1128 (2002)). Marr cannot meet his burden in this case. 
Marr claims the district court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to 
"consider the sentencing factors in I.C. § 19-2521" and "the well established 
sentencing goals." (Appellant's Brief, pp.1-2.) However, the district court was "not 
required to recite the factors set forth in Idaho Code§ 19-2521, nor [was] it required 
to give reasons for imposing the sentence." Flowers, 150 Idaho at 575, 249 P.3d at 
374 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, Marr's assertion that the court did not consider 
the goals of sentencing is belied by the record. 
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While the district court did not specifically recite the four goals of sentencing -
it referenced both the protection of society and Marr's lack of rehabilitative potential. 
After the court pronounced its sentence, it stated: 
I need to explain to you why this is my decision. When I was 
preparing late last night for your case and thinking about it again this 
morning, I was hopeful that I would see something different from you 
that I hadn't seen in the presentence report, hopeful to see something 
different from you that we hadn't seen up to this point in time, and that 
was really taking responsibility for what happened, and you didn't do 
that, and so if you are not willing to admit to what you did do and what 
the jury found you guilty of, then there's - then there's no hope for 
treatment. There's no hope for treatment on a retained. 
(Sent. Tr., p.43, L.21 - p.44, L.7.) 
With respect to the primary goal of protecting society, the court stated: 
You're --you are delusional, sir, and society needs to be protected from 
delusional people. You have a record of being violent. You have a 
current evaluation of being uncontrollably violent, and you won't admit 
to what you've done, so there is no hope to treat you. You just need to 
go to prison. 
(Sent. Tr., p.45, Ls.13-19.) 
The court's decision is supported by the record. Marcy testified that she and 
Marr got into an argument during which he told her she "had to listen and do what he 
says because [she] was married to him." (Trial Tr., p66, Ls.17-18.) Marcy asked 
Marr if she could leave the house and call her daughter and Marr "wouldn't let [her] 
go" and took her phone. (Trial Tr., p.66, Ls.18-20, p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.4.) The 
argument then escalated and Marcy testified Marr "choked" her and Marcy bit Marr 
so he would let her go. (Trial Tr., p.69, L.19 - p.70, L.21, p.78, L.4 - p.83, L.4.) 
Marr released Marcy and told her "go sit in a chair, he was calling the cops." (Trial 
Tr., p.84, Ls.4-23.) One of the responding officers noted "Marcy's bottom lip was 
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extremely swollen and she had swelling to her face." (R., p.11; also Trial Tr., p.157, 
Ls.9-10.) The officer also "noticed Marcy's eyes had red splotchy areas on the white 
parts of her eyes" and "bruises on her neck and chest area as well as her left arm." 
(R., p.11; also Trial Tr., p.157, Ls.8-12, Exhibits 1, 2.) 
As noted by the district court, Marr's violent behavior during this incident with 
Marcy is consistent with his history. Marr's criminal history includes an aggravated 
rape (amended to "unk [sic] gross misdemeanor"), terroristic threat, battery (two 
convictions), infliction of corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant, assault with a 
deadly weapon, and false imprisonment (PSI, pp.4-6.) Marr has also been 
convicted of criminal possession of a firearm. (PSI, p.5.) Notably, the domestic 
violence evaluator concluded Marr is in the "maximum risk range" on the "Violence 
Scale" and is in the "problem risk range" on the "Stress Coping Scale." (Domestic 
Violence Evaluation, p.4.) 
The record also supports the district court's finding that Marr lacks 
rehabilitative potential and is delusional. According to one of Marr's prior probation 
officers, Marr's attitude about domestic violence is "disturbing." (PSI, p.10.) When 
given a domestic violence questionnaire by the probation officer, Marr said "he 
couldn't accurately fill out the form, because he felt he did nothing wrong and could 
not give them the answers they wanted to hear." (PSI, p.10.) Marr routinely blames 
his partners for his violence, claiming his victims are drunk and/or violent and he just 
tries to "protect himself." (PSI, p.10.) Marr took this same stance in this case, 
claiming Marcy is an alcoholic who "violently attacked him," and even going so far as 
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to claim the victim "was choking herself." (Sent Tr., p.27, L.6 - p.28, L.17, p.33, L.14 
- p.36, L.24.) 
Marr's claim that the district court failed to consider "any of the well 
established sentencing goals" is belied by the record and his assertion that the 
district court abused its sentencing discretion is without merit. 
11. 
If This Court Considers Marr's Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims, The Claims 
Fail Because Marr Has Failed To Cite Anything In The Record To Support His 
Claims Or Otherwise Establish Counsel Was Ineffective 
A. Introduction 
Marr contends his trial counsel was ineffective for a variety of reasons. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) Idaho appellate courts generally do not consider ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. Even if this Court considers the 
merits of Marr's claims, the claims fail because Marr has failed to cite anything in the 
record to support his assertions or otherwise establish that counsel was ineffective. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law 
and fact." Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011) (citations 
omitted). 
C. Appellate Courts Generally Do Not Consider Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel Claims Raised On Direct Appeal; However, To The Extent This 
Court Considers Marr's Claims, Nothing In The Record Supports His 
Assertion That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective 
Marr was represented by a public defender through trial and sentencing, and 
the public defender filed a Rule 35 motion on Marr's behalf. (See generally 
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transcripts; R., p.149.) A few months later, Marr filed a "Stipulation for Substitution 
of Counsel and Withdrawal of Public Defender," substituting John Mitchell, who also 
represents Marr on appeal, for the public defender and a "Stipulation to Continue 
Restitution and Rule 35 Motion Hearings." (R., pp.153-156.) The Rule 35 motion 
was later withdrawn and the parties entered into a stipulation regarding restitution. 
(!STARS, Register of Actions, State of Idaho v. John Marr, Kootenai County Case 
No. CR-2011-17515.) No additional motions were filed in the district court. (See id.) 
On appeal, Marr contends the public defender provided ineffective assistance 
because, he asserts: (1) he "met with his counsel less than five times with no 
meeting lasting longer than 15 minutes"; (2) he "does not remember if he was 
prepped by his counsel prior to sentencing'" (3) "[t]he 'victim' in this matter had 
extensive criminal history including intoxication and assault and battery," which 
"corroborates [his] theory of self defense but was not presented at trial or just as 
importantly at sentencing"; (4) his "brother attempted numerous times to contact 
[Marr's] attorney about testifying and never had his calls returned"; and (5) "counsel 
did not have [Marr] testify at sentencing regarding mitigation nor did ... counsel call 
any mitigating witnesses at sentencing." (Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court "has recognized that a defendant may raise the 
issue of the effectiveness of counsel from a trial resulting in a criminal conviction, 
while cautioning that this course of action may result in application of the doctrine of 
res judicata." Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834, 203 P.3d 1221, 1233 (2009) 
(citing Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272, 274, 787 P.2d 258, 260 (1990)). "[A] claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel usually requires an evidentiary hearing, and 
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· resolution of such claims can be difficult for an appellate court examining a trial 
record in which counsel's performance was not at issue." Smith, 146 Idaho at 834, 
203 P.3d at 1233 (citing Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791, 702 P.2d 826, 829 
(1985) (citation omitted)). "Because of [the appellate court's] inability to resolve 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the bare trial record, th[e] 
Court has, on several occasions, declined to address such claims on direct appeal, 
suggesting that the defendant could pursue the claim on a subsequent application 
for post-conviction relief." State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376, 859 P.2d 972, 974 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
To the extent this Court follows the principle stated in Mitchell in this case, 
Marr's ineffective assistance of counsel claims should not be considered. If, 
however, this Court addresses Marr's claims because he has elected to raise them 
in these proceedings, he has failed to cite anything in the record to support his 
assertions. Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) requires the appellant's argument to 
include "citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record 
relied upon." Cf. Idaho State Bar v. Clark, 153 Idaho 349, 356, 283 P.3d 96, 103 
(2012) ("this Court will not search the record on appeal for unspecified error"). While 
Marr recites the legal standards applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, his argument contains no citation to any portion of the record or transcript to 
support his claims. (Appellant's Brief, pp.3-4.) In fact, the only information regarding 
the performance of counsel the state could find is Marr's positive comments about 
counsel made in conjunction with his corrections to the PSI where he states: "Uh, I 
have a lawyer right here sitting beside me that I've had no problem dealing with. I 
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don't think she's had a problem dealing with me. I may be wrong. There's been no 
problems." (Sent. Tr., p.35, Ls.15-18.) Nor has Marr explained how his allegations 
against trial counsel constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). With respect to the 
deficient performance prong, the United States Supreme Court has articulated the 
defendant's burden under Strickland as follows: 
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a 
conviction must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. A court considering a claim of 
ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption that counsel's 
representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance. The challenger's burden is to show that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787. "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 19.:. (citations and quotations 
omitted). "It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on 
the outcome of the proceeding." 19.:. Rather, "[c]ounsel's errors must be so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 19.:. 
Although Marr complains about the amount of time he was able to meet with 
counsel, this does not mean counsel was deficient. As noted by the Seventh Circuit 
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in United Statesv. Olson, 846 F.2d 1103, 1108 (ih Cir. 1988): "We know of no case 
establishing a minimum number of meetings between counsel and client prior to trial 
necessary to prepare an attorney to provide effective assistance of counsel. Nor 
have any cases establishing such a minimum been presented to us by Olson's 
appellate counsel." (Citations, quotations, and brackets omitted). Moreover, Marr 
has failed to explain what additional meetings would have accomplished. As such, 
he has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced as a result of the number and 
length of his meetings with counsel. 
Marr has likewise failed to identify what testimony his brother had to offer that 
would have been relevant to his case. Consequently, Marr has not articulated either 
deficient performance or resulting prejudice from counsel's alleged failure to speak 
with his brother. 
Finally, Marr has failed to explain on what theory Marcy's "criminal history 
including intoxication and assault and battery" would have been admissible at trial 
and the record belies any assertion that he did not present a defense theory that 
Marcy was intoxicated and attacked him. (See generally Trial Tr., pp.112-113, 
118129-130, 194-196) The same is true regarding his presentation at sentencing, 
which is inconsistent with any argument that he was somehow hampered by counsel 
in providing the court with mitigating evidence at sentencing. (See generally Sent. 
Tr.) Indeed, Marr himself was allowed to make "corrections" to the presentence 
report'during which he gave his version of past events and he had the opportunity to 
make whatever statements he wished. (Sent. Tr., pp.3-30, 33-38.) Further, Marr 
has failed to identify what mitigating evidence counsel prevented him from 
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presenting or explain how that would have made a difference in the court's 
sentencing determination, especially given his extensive violent history and 
demonstrated lack of rehabilitative potential based, in part, on his inability to accept 
responsibility - which are the two factors the court emphasized at sentencing. 
In short, nothing in the records supports Marr's claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective and, in many instances, the record belies his assertions. Thus, to the 
extent this Court, considers Marr's claim that trial counsel was ineffective, his claim 
fails. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Marr's judgment of conviction 
for felony domestic battery. 
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2013. 
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JfSSICA M. LORELLO 
DBputy Attorney General 
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